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“Why do we have to kill African people, peasants like us?”: The articulated 
scenario of desertions 
Desertion has not been a phenomenon limited to the end of Estado Novo: the 
police registered the phenomenon during the early 1960s, as the anti-colonial 
propaganda did. This scenario is even more complex if we consider the variety of cases 
of desertion present in the numerous information recorded by the political police and in 
the anti-colonialist propaganda; we can find soldiers denounced as subversives because 
of political ideas considered as enemies of the state as we can find physical descriptions 
without any mention of soldiers’ political opinions. For almost fifteen years from the 
early 1960s until the end of the dictatorship and the colonies’ independence, the cases of 
deserters and draft dodgers were in the thousands. The scenario is multi-faceted: the 
soldiers’ origin, the recruitment and training place, the place and moment of desertion 
and, of course, reasons for desertion. Soldiers of Portuguese origin deserted both in 
Portugal and in Africa, soldiers with African origin deserted both in Africa and 
Portugal, and white African sons of colonists deserted.  
Furthermore, not all deserters escaped to European countries or from colonies to 
other African countries; there have been cases of deserters who before being shipped off 
to war left the army but remained hidden in Portugal. The quality of questionnaires 
distributed to Portuguese deserters who arrived in France and who joined one of the 
solidarity networks in opposition to the regime and to the war, show the variety of exit 
routes from the army and Portugal. Reasons for desertion have been numerous and not 
all the instances of insubordination to military orders had the same political reasons or 
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motivations. If it is true that during the last years of the war there were desertions for 
political reasons, we cannot forget that the fact that during the first years of the war the 
soldiers also had political reasons. It was the case of Joaquim Correia Agostinho 
denounced by the foreign minister to the PIDE Director in September 1961 with the 
following reason: «The soldier, his father and his sister, have subversive ideas: they 
read and spread clandestine and forbidden books (…) almost all his relatives are 
considered bad people and suspicious for their subversive ideas».1 
Testimonies on the reasons of the desertion transmitted through clandestine 
radios or published by the anticolonial propaganda underline a variety of aspects. «Why 
should we travel to another continent? Why do we have to kill African people, peasants 
like us», asked Fernando Ribeiro Outeirinho, who deserted from Guinea in 19662. The 
declarations made by deserters were also conditioned by the moment and the place of 
desertion. A young officer, for example, abandoned the army in 1967, just before being 
shipped off to Angola and remained in Portugal clandestinely; he testified he wasn’t 
isolated thanks to an important antimilitaristic tradition in Portugal, not restricted to the 
colonial war3. The situation was different for those who experienced the colonial war 
and saw the soldiers of liberation movements fighting. In these cases, the declarations 
mostly concern the conviction that the Portuguese government was fighting a lost – as 
well as unfair - war. 
The colonial war, the anti-colonialism ad the desertions are fundamental to 
understand the end of the Estado Novo; they also offer a wide-ranging perspective of the 
1960s and 1970s, because they had a primary importance in the formation of the left 
wing groups opposing the PCP and of the armed struggle organizations. Moreover, 
during these years, from 1961 until 1974, there was a continuous, mass movement of 
people, political ideas, forms of struggle, at a transnational level. The student 
movements, the workers’ strikes, the emergence of Maoist groups and of other left wing 
groups, the beginning of the armed struggle, the anticolonial fight are obviously linked 
with what was happening in other parts of the globe at the same time.   
A perspective that considers people movements in these years also forces us to 
contextualize and problematize concepts such as radicalism and politicization, 
frequently used in the literature about the “long sixties”. Portuguese movements during 
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the sixties were or were not radical? Compared to what? Compared to the past, to the 
kind of dictatorship they were acting in, to the contemporary movements developing in 
other countries, to the traditional forms of conflict? What did the colonial war and the 
rejection of war mean for the radicalization and politicization of young people?  
 
The 25th of April was born in Guinea. Portugal in transnational perspective.  
The decay of the Portuguese colonial empire begun in 1961: on February 4, the 
armed struggle in Angola started with the raid on prisons in Luanda. In December, the 
Indian union re-occupied Goa, Damão en Diu and the Portuguese army, much reduced 
compared to the enemy forces, offered almost no resistance. The loss of colonial 
territories in India and the beginning of the war in Angola did not prevent the 
government from continuing the “ultramarine” policy, adding two new war fronts, at the 
outbreak of war in Guinea in January 1963 and in Mozambique in September 1964.  
At the end of 1964, almost 85,000 men were engaged in Africa, an extremely 
high and disproportionate number in comparison with the size of Portugal; the numbers 
of soldiers shipped to the colonies is fundamental to understanding what it meant, both 
for Portugal and the colonies, such as forces’ deployment during thirteen years of 
colonial war4.  
Some of the soldiers engaged in this enormous war operation, would have a key 
role in the ending of the dictatorship. As we know, soldiers who directly experienced 
the colonial war carried out the 25th April coup d’état. The armed forces movement was 
plural and heterogeneous and neither the April “captains”, nor all soldiers who 
participated in the colonial war had the same paths to consciousness and politicization. 
The direct experience of the war and mostly the awareness that the Portuguese 
army was losing the war against the liberation movements had a key role in the 
preparation of the coup. There is a circularity among African liberation movements, 
Portugal, colonial war and April 25th. Miguel dos Santos, Manecas, member of the 
PAIGC and guerrilla fighter for the independence in Guinea and Cape Verde, 
synthetized the weight of the colonial situation for the coup of 1974: «April 25th was 
born in Guinea». The declaration has a military perspective: all soldiers who had a key 
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role in this day fought in Guinea and there they realized they were losing the war and 
that another way out had to be found5.  
In addition, the leaders of the liberation movements had some of their 
experiences outside of  colonial territories. In Portugal, there was the Casa dos 
Estudantes do Imperio (CEI). Between 1944 and 1965, the Casa, founded by the 
Minister of Colonies Vieira Machado, worked as a means of support and control of the 
students of colonies. With a headquarters in Lisbon and two in Coimbra, the CEI 
welcomed not only African but also Portuguese students. The aim was to reinforce the 
“emperor mentality” and the diffusion of the Portugueseness among young people, but 
was precisely there where feelings against the dictatorship and the colonial war were 
born, together with the curiosity and the valorization of the languages and cultures of 
colonized African people.  
The movements and the relationships between Portugal and abroad concerning 
the colonial question are not restricted to the colonial territories. From 1963 in Algiers, 
there was the Frente Patriótica de Libertaçao Nacional, that had the Radio Voz da 
Liberdade and that in the last years of the Estado Novo had a fundamental role in 
contesting the war and supporting deserters from the Portuguese army. The Algerian 
FLN gave the means and the spaces to the Portuguese for their propaganda through the 
radio. In Algiers there were many Portuguese exiles, some of them organized in the 
Junta de Acção Patriótica dos Portugueses de Argélia (JAPPA)6.  
Some European destinations also had a key role in Portuguese anti-colonialism, 
thanks to the creation of groups and deserter support committees. From France, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, the anti-colonial propaganda arrived in Portugal, 
with messages coming from the national liberation movements.  
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Rebellion and desertion in Portugal and the colonies.   
Desertions occurred from the beginning of the war, but two collective desertions 
during the 1970s were the most famous actions. The first happened in 1970: a group of 
seven officers who deserted from Portugal, arrived in Sweden where they made 
declarations against the war, which caused a big ripple in the international media7. Two 
years later, five navy sailors deserted from Copenhagen when the Nato frigate which 
they had boarded stopped in the Danish port. The Committee of Portuguese Deserters in 
Sweden (Malmo/Lund section) welcomed the five sailors – they were between 19 and 
25 years old – and from there they took part in press conferences giving a political 
motive for their desertion. In this case, the rejection of the army and of the war are 
accompanied by the conditions in the Navy (discrimination, punishment, humiliation, 
bullying by officers) and the awareness that war was not just unfair but also lost8. As 
mentioned above, not all deserters had Portuguese origins, or were born and brought up 
in Portugal. There were deserters with African origins and also deserters with 
Portuguese origins born in the colonies. The recruitment to the army of soldiers with 
African origins was part the process of the “Africanization”: from 1963/64 the 
Portuguese government increased the resources to finance the three war fronts. New 
tactics were introduced, such as the Africanization of the army through the recruitment 
of indigenous people, with the following objectives: to fill a deficit of soldiers; improve 
the capacity to penetrate the territory; give an appearance of integration of indigenous 
population; avoid African people joining the guerrillas9.  
Young Mozambican, settlers’ offspring, also involved themselves in desertion. 
In May 1963 the weekly Révolution Africaine, published in Algiers, gave the news 
about the desertion of four young Mozambicans (two doctors and two students)  from 
the Portuguese army: «These four Mozambicans are white colonialists’ sons; in 
Maghreb they would be pieds noir; they are part of the 150,000 “civilized”, colonialist, 
mestizos, Indians, “assimilated”, whom the colonial authority recognized the right to 
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exist (the other Mozambicans, six million “indigenous” do not have any legal 
existence»10. The anti-colonial propaganda also contains information on cases of 
insubordination which happened in Africa. One example is the case of the internee 
soldiers in the Luanda psychiatric hospital. In March 1972, they organized a revolt 
inside the hospital and they resisted police for 36 hours. Later when they had been put 
on a boat back to Lisbon, they rebelled again destroying the inside of the boat. 
According to this article, the Luanda psychiatric hospital functioned as an alternative to 
imprisoning soldiers and officers who could not stand the reactionary violence of the 
war and rebelled in the barracks or on the battlefield: «the way to repress these actions 
is not imprisonment because that would cause the revolt of the entire unit (…). Instead 
of having prisoners, they created the mentally ill»11.  
 
“So desert, but desert revolutionarily”. Anti-colonialism inside and outside 
Portugal.  
Portuguese deserters and draft dodgers organized political and propaganda 
groups against the war and the dictatorship in France, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden and Canada. The bulletins of these groups gave logistical information about 
how to desert, offering news about the liberation war in the colonies. They also referred 
to struggles across the globe, denouncing the Portuguese army’s crimes (torture, 
slaughter and concentration camps).  
The Committees organized political and propaganda activities supporting 
deserters and draft dodgers, helped by local activists. These groups expressed the 
rejection of war and fascism that demonstrated opposition to the regime on a grand 
scale, separate from the PCP’s fight against the war. For the whole of the sixties, 
Avante! spoke in favour of desertion, and in 1967 formulated a thesis, which – while 
exalting the phenomenon as the expression of a big protest movement coming from the 
Portuguese youth – invited Communist militants not to desert from the war. The 
Communists – the CC sustained – must work to encourage desertion, but they should 
not actually desert, except to aid a collective desertion or in the event of imprisonment 
after a revolutionary action. The formulation is clear but it contains an ambiguous base 
                                                           
10
 ANTT- PIDE/DGS SC C (1) 1070 UI 1209. 
11
 SC C (2) 19181 UI 7831. 
436 
 
concerning the rejection of the war, according to the distinction between Communists 
and non-Communists: «The CC considers that the many desertions of Party members – 
although integrated within protest and resistance against the war – did not help 
development and organization of the revolutionary movement. If all revolutionary 
elements abandon the army, it would became a docile but efficient instrument for the 
fascist police (…). Communist militants must courageously continue their revolutionary 
task in the army, in Portugal and the colonies, clarifying the ideas of their comrades 
organizing more decisive and more combative soldiers, stimulating and organizing 
desertions and other forms of action and protest against the colonial war»12.  
The deserter support Committees had to consider this position coming from the 
PCP, however, the positions on desertion continued to be plural and varied. In Sweden, 
there were three sections of deserter Committees, in Uppsala, Malmo/Lund and 
Stockholm. The Uppsala section, in 1972, ended the organized work; the Malmo/Lund 
section published the bulletin Guerra à Guerra, and the information organ of the 
Stockholm section was called Boletim. The editorial of issue 2 of this Boletim, was very 
polemic against the editorial of issue 4 of Guerra à Guerra. The Stockholm Committee 
(CDPE) was accused of not having taken a position on desertion. The CDPE, which 
supported China and Albania policies, expressed itself against both the so-called 
“social-fascist” position, which proposed collective desertions from the colonies, and 
against the so-called “adventurist” position, which contemplated armed desertion and 
armed actions inside the army. Instead, the CDPE proposed anti-colonial propaganda, 
agitation and organization within the fascist army and desertion before being shipped 
off to the colonies following training, and the continuation of struggle in the emigrant 
environment. 
In France, there was the bilingual bulletin Luta. The first issue, dated April 1971, 
took an unclear position on desertion, but that contemplated that desertion would 
happen in the colonies and not just before boarding: “encourage collective desertion and 
insubordination acts both in Portugal and on the colonial front weakening the potential 
of the Portuguese colonial army, increasing the soldiers’ discontent”13. In May 1972 in 
France the Comité de Apoio aos desertores e refractários portugueses (CADRP) was 
also set up. The manifesto stated that the group was born from the initiative of more 
than 100 French and Portuguese anti-imperialists. The CADRP supported the journal A 
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Voz do Desertor, the journal O Salto, the movement of emigrant Portuguese workers 
(MTPE), the Comités de Luta anti-colonial (CLACS) that edited the bulletin Vencerão! 
The CADRP had the same position on desertion of A Voz do Desertor.  
The Manifesto dos Soldados Portugueses, a little book dated January 1972 
circulated in the deserter committees. These soldiers claimed affiliation with the Partido 
Comunista Marxista Leninista (PCML) and they started their manifesto underlining 
that, before entering the army, they were workers, exploited by bosses and landowners 
and by the State. In this case, work is their tie with the people in the colonies. The 
position on the war and on desertion was intransigent about fighting (in any case 
soldiers had to fight on the colonial front). Soldiers had to resist from inside the 
barracks, with guns, but carrying out a mass, revolutionary action. The fight had to be 
closely linked to the workers’ struggle and it was necessary to have a strong and 
revolutionary soldier organisation. These prerequisites, as the manifesto recognized, did 
not exist. Soldiers who had been shipped off had to occupy the boat with guns and 
return to Portugal, and never reach the colonies. Desertion was proposed as a last resort 
and must be armed: «When you see that you cannot fight in the army any longer, when 
you run the danger of being arrested because your revolutionary action was discovered, 
when you are going to be shipped off to the colonies and you cannot collectively desert, 
then desert! But desert revolutionarily, with the guns and the munitions»14.  
Desertion with guns was the only solution also for the Portuguese Refugee 
Committee in the Netherlands that published the bulletin Deserção. The rejection of 
military service was considered wrong because the army offered training and, in this 
way, soldiers could acquire military experience, they could conduct political agitation 
and confiscate army supplies to use at the moment of revolution. In the Netherlands, 
there was another Committee, founded in 1970 and called Associação Resistência e 
Trabalho (ART). The group published the journal Novo Rumo, with data on legal and 
illegal migration, interviews with deserters, information about exploitation in various 
parts of the globe, and a cultural and social section dedicated to poetry and music. The 
journal collaborated with the previously mentioned journal O Salto, which was the 
organ of federated associations, the Clube dos Jovens Trabalhadores Portugueses em 
Paris, the Centro de Difusão da cultura portuguesa, the Clube dos Portugueses em 
                                                           
14
 Ivi.  
438 
 
Brie, and ART15. The polemic on desertion involved all deserters and refugee 
committees spread across Europe. No one agreed with the PCP’s position, which 
considered joining the colonial front. However, the discourse about how to desert - with 
or without guns, individually or collectively- was articulated and they discussed in 
detail about the permanence of soldiers inside the army, which meant participating in 
the war. The bulletin Insurreição, published by the Denmark Deserter committee, for 
example, held that soldiers, once mobilized for war, had to desert and steal as many 
weapons and munitions as they could, to be kept until the moment of insurrection. This 
Committee also denounced as opportunist the position of the União Revolucionária 
Marxista Leninista (URML) that held that soldiers who fought in the colonies were 
assassins and traitors of the working class. Despite this opinion, the URML considered 
that escape abroad was an individualistic and opportunistic attitude and working in the 
army was encouraged, such as organization of sabotage and espionage. In the case of 
mobilization to the colonies, the URML recommended continuing the propaganda and 
suggested fighting in favour of African troops, occupying territories for the liberation 
movements, and in this way, it did not exclude participation in the war16. 
The rejection of the war and desertion were complex phenomena; the 
publications of the committees offer a variety of positions and show the wide-ranging 
spectrum of the Portuguese left during these years17. In this plural, multifaceted 
scenario, accusations of opportunism, revisionism, individualism and adventurism were 
made against each other. There were also less polemical positions, such as the campaign 
led by Portuguese students abroad: «alone or accompanied, with or without the guns, we 
have to say no18».  
While deserter and refugee committees were organizing themselves, 
simultaneously in Portugal the anti-colonial feelings became more openly manifested.  
As an in-depth study showed, just at the end of 1969, important episodes against the war 
took place in the student environments, which would grown thanks to the birth of the 
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CLAC (founded by the militants of the Esquerda Democrática Estudantil - EDE and of 
the CMPL)19. 
The CLAC through the publication of Vencerão! developed an intense anti-
colonial activity in Portugal. The journal O Salto, in August 1972 published an 
interview with some members of the CLAC. The organisation, which was born from the 
student milieu, answered the crucial question “the national liberation fight in Angola 
began in 1961. Why have nine years passed before the creation of a specific 
organization against the colonial war”? The explanation given by the CLAC was based 
on the fact that in 1961 the antifascist movement in Portugal did not include any 
authentically popular force and was subject to the alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie. 
The position on desertion was to enter the army, learn how to manage guns, and desert 
just before boarding. Furthermore, they invited young Portuguese not to emigrate and 
remain in Portugal to conduct anti-colonial agitation inside the army and propaganda 
activities inside the country.  
Despite these indications, the Clacs were not intransigent, because they did not 
refuse to support emigration by those who declined to do military service, because they 
considered it better than participation in the war20. The CLAC had two different 
components: those who published Vencerão! were linked to the PCP (m-l), others to the 
Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado (MRPP), and they were 
organized in the MPAC. The Maoist group MRPP had the greatest impact in the 
organization of the anti-colonial fight in Portugal and their journal, Luta Popular, had a 
great anti-colonial connotation from its first issue 21.  
 
Left wing groups and armed struggle against the war.  
The colonial war and anti- colonialism played a decisive role in the PCP, in the 
left wing organizations and, of course, in the relationships between them.  
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The first armed action by the Accão Revolucionária Armada (ARA), on October 
26, 1970, was against the Cunene boat in the Lisbon port, due to transport army supplies 
to Africa. In March of the following year, ARA destroyed 30 helicopters and military 
planes at the Tancos air base and in June the organization blew up radio telegraphic 
equipment that caused a communications blackout for six hours. One year after the first 
action, electronic equipment from the new OTAN department in Oeiras was destroyed. 
The last action by ARA took place in August 1972, with damage and destruction of 20 
electricity pylons; this action was conducted simultaneously in Lisbon, Porto and 
Coimbra. ARA actions were always approved by the PCP. The organization was born 
with the consensus and the support of the Party’s leaders. On the one hand, the PCP, 
approving the formation of ARA continued the line imposed after Cunhal’s escape from 
prison, to cancel the “peaceful orientation” led by the PCP during his prison. On the 
other, the new organisation could channel the pressures – inside and outside the Party – 
in favour of the armed actions and could act against the attacks from the left that were 
criticizing the Party as reformist and opportunist.  
The case of two other armed struggle organizations, created in Portugal between 
the end of sixties and the beginning of seventies - Liga de União e de Accão 
Revolucionária (LUAR) and the Brigadas Revolutionárias (BR) - was different. The 
LUAR started the armed struggle against the Salazarist regime; the group, led by 
Hermínio Palma Inácio put into practice a line of direct action already theorized by the 
Frente de Accão Popular (FAP) and by the Movimento de Accão Revolucionária 
(MAR)22, that did not carry out any operations23. The actions of the league ended in 
September 1973 because of the imprisonment of its militants. LUAR was the group that 
started the armed struggle against the regime, but it did not have an important role in the 
theoretical debate with the PCP, as the BR did24.  
The BR had the greatest anti-colonial character and Carlos Antunes and Isabel 
do Carmo, who founded the Brigades had, together with other militants, a key role in 
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the anti–colonial struggle in Algiers, with the leaders of the PAIGC, of the FRELIMO 
and of the MPLA. They transmitted military information and maps and a report on the 
situation of the war in Angola written by Costa Gomes, stolen from the Caetano’s office 
to the liberation movements. The Antunes testimony offers interesting insights into the 
various and different levels of opposition to the war coming from the PCP, 
remembering the “great drama” experienced by the Party concerning the war and the 
need to avoid breaking the alliance with some pro-war sectors of bourgeoisie25. The 
split between Carlos Antunes and Isabel do Carmo and the PCP happened in Algiers 
and had fundamental consequences. This was because the BR successfully requested to 
take over the radio station Voz da Liberdade from the Algerian government. The station 
was controlled by the PCP after the FPLN internal split. The removal of the PCP from 
Algiers, use of the radio station, the Algerian government’s support, all enhanced the 
BR’s role in Algeria from 1969. This happened at the same time as the development of 
the electoral movement in Portugal and of the so- called “primavera marcelista”.  A 
solution to the colonial question became increasingly urgent. The Brigades arose 
specifically to contrast with the PCP position on the colonial war: «The armed struggle 
made more sense at that time because of the colonial war. The issue became crucial 
inside the PCP, at the base of the Party. There was a great disillusionment with 
Marcelismo and the possibility of armed struggle arose. This led us to abandon the Party 
and, among many vicissitudes, to found the BR (…)»26. 
The first action of the Brigades took place on November 7, 1971, against the 
OTAN department at Fonte de Telha. The BR claimed responsibility for the action 
declaring the fight of liberation movements against imperialism had inspired it. The 
victory was dedicated to the heroic fight of the people of Vietnam, Angola, Guinea, 
Mozambique and Palestine27. A few days later the BR destroyed a battery of guns in 
Barreiro. The following year, starting from March, they undertook various actions: the 
cutting of electricity; the theft of hundreds of kilos of explosives in the Algarve; the 
destruction of 15 trucks ready to be delivered to the army; the distribution of pamphlets, 
using petards, against the presidential election of Americo Tomás; the sabotage of 
Marconi electronic equipment at Palmela and Sesimbra; the theft of military maps for 
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the FRELIMO, the MPLA, the PAIGC. In March 1973, the BR attacked the army 
recruitment centre in Avenida de Berna and the headquarters of Rua da Fonseca and of 
Graça. On this occasion, two militants died. The following action, the attack on the 
recruitment department in Porto, was dedicated to the memory of the dead two 
comrades, Luis and Ernesto. On May 1, the BR blew up hundreds of petards inciting the 
protest of workers and in October another barracks was attacked, and almost all the 
archives were destroyed. In February 1974, BR organized an incursion to damage the 
army headquarters in Bissau. The last action, in April 1974, was the sabotage of a boat 
called Niassa, which was set to transport army supplies to Guinea. These armed actions 
were important, and were underlined by a specific anti-colonial political position: «In 
Portugal there were many anti-colonial actions, well done and interesting, but that were 
like charity action from the Portuguese poor to the colonized poor. These movements 
also had a paternalistic position: they supported the movements because, poor them, 
they were oppressed. The chance of an open discussion, on an equal level, considering 
them people with the same political perspective, with which we could agree or not, 
never appeared»28. 
 
Paths of research 
The experiences of desertion, the political lines elaborated by draft dodgers and 
deserters in Europe, the anti-colonialism born in Portugal and the operations undertaken 
by the armed struggle organisations are some threads of a wide-ranging net that, as I 
tried to show, connect Portugal with Guinea, Angola, Mozambique and Algeria in 
Africa and with France, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands in Europe. We also have to 
consider the fact that the armed struggle militants spent months of military training in 
Cuba and the Soviet Union and they drew inspiration from guerrillas and from conflicts 
in other parts of the world, such as Vietnam and Palestine. The fights against the 
Brazilian dictatorship also influenced the Portuguese anti-colonialism: for example, the 
FPLN published the Manual do Guerrilheiro Urbano published in Brazil in 1969 and 
written by Carlos Marighella, leader of the armed struggle against the regime from 
196429.  
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The focus on colonial war and anti-colonialism in the sixties and seventies in 
Portugal enable us to concentrate on a crucial moment within Portuguese contemporary 
history, with some elements that problematize the idea of a peaceful coup d’état and of 
a non-violent transition to democracy. It allows us, moreover,  to highlight some points 
for possible paths of research.  
The first one I suggest is the relationship between radicalism, politicisation, 
insubordination, movements and organisations. The plurality of the phenomenon “no to 
the war”, understood as the anti-colonial activism in Portugal and abroad and as 
resistance to the military service and desertion from the army, stimulate interesting 
questions about the levels of resistance to the war and the fight against the State and 
against the government. Not all deserters had the same motivations, the same paths of 
politicization and the same political ideas. The thousands of exiles and deserters were 
involved in insubordination, resistance and rejection acts against the fascist regime and 
these are not attributable to a unique political idea nor the same path of militancy. This 
fact brings us to question the radicalism, not considering it as an abstract category and 
to study the true paths and the multifaceted choices that led to thousands of people 
fighting in Portugal or abroad and escaping.  
The question of desertion causes us to consider the choices of the youth and to 
contextualize the struggle bearing in mind the condition of the soldiers and the fact they 
were young and, as a generation, they were catapulted into the war when the world was 
going through crucial transformations. These young were soldiers and as soldiers 
expressed different ways of opposition to the army and to the war. There were varying 
degrees of insubordination, directed against different subjects and institutions: the 
officers, the government, the State. This fact is important when we consider that 
soldiers who took part in the colonial war were responsible for what happened on the 
25th of April. Many of those soldiers would become “revolutionary heroes” during the 
18 months between April 25, 1974 and November 25, 1975. We have to take into 
account that the role of the MFA during the PREC created a myth around the soldiers 
who ended the dictatorship causing the removal of violence from the regime and the 
army. 
War and anti-colonialism are fundamental in the formation of left wing and 
armed struggle groups in opposition to the PCP. Both in Portugal and abroad, the PCP 
and left wing groups made mutual accusations of opportunism and adventurism. This 
element is crucial for studies on the ideological matrices, on the political forms, on the 
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use of violence, starting from a concrete case, and in this one, referring to a long-period 
event such as the war was. How the anti-colonial discourse is articulated is an important 
element to study; for example of the case of the Manifesto of Portuguese Soldiers 
mentioned above is particularly interesting. They demonstrated the opposition between 
the “revolutionary workers” and the bourgeoisie, but in other cases, the student milieu 
for instance, although not only, complaints about military discipline carried the greatest 
weight. For the Manifesto, work and class membership are fundamental to the 
construction of anti-colonial discourse. It would be possible to open a study on the 
articulation of anti-colonial discourse, considering who was involved, the influences 
and mutual relationships between violence, anti- imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti- 
militarism and anti-racism.  
 
